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Weaponized Claude Code Extension Gives Hackers Persistent Remote Access to Developer Systems

A weaponized Claude Code extension found on Open VSX can give attackers persistent remote access to developer systems by planting an SSH key, opening a reverse tunnel, and installing startup scripts. OpenSourceMalware identified the tampered package as anthropic.claude-code version 2.1.313.

The analyzed sample targeted macOS on Apple Silicon. However, its injected code also contained Linux and Windows branches. Crucially, the findings confirm a malicious artifact, not a proven compromise of Anthropic’s official Visual Studio Marketplace release or its wider distribution systems. How the package was altered remains unknown.

SSH Backdoor Creates Persistent Access

According to OpenSourceMalware’s technical analysis, attackers placed a 66-line JavaScript loader at the beginning of extension.js, ahead of the legitimate extension bundle. Loading that module triggers the malicious code. Developers do not need to start a Claude conversation.

The loader imports Node.js modules for running commands, handling files, collecting system details, and making network requests. Most errors are suppressed, allowing the normal extension to keep working even when malicious steps fail. The harmful code runs during extension activity rather than through package installation scripts.

This approach echoes the earlier Nx Console extension compromise, where injected code ran when developers opened a workspace. That comparison highlights a shared risk, not evidence that the incidents have the same attackers.

The implant adds an attacker-controlled Ed25519 public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys with the comment svc-telemetry. It sets the SSH directory permissions to 0700 and the authorized_keys file to 0600, making the setup resemble a normal SSH configuration.

It then tries to enable Remote Login on macOS, start an SSH service on Linux, or install and start OpenSSH Server through PowerShell on Windows. These steps depend on available permissions and may fail without stopping the remaining code.

An embedded private key is decoded into a temporary .stk_ file. The malware connects to tunnel@134.209.82.225 and requests reverse forwarding to localhost port 22. This creates a route from the attacker’s server to the victim’s SSH service, provided that service is available.

The tunnel disables server identity checks and reconnects after 60 seconds. On Unix-like systems, it prefers autossh and otherwise uses ssh.

On macOS, persistence uses ~/.config/.smt, ~/.config/.smtk, and a LaunchAgent named com.apple.sysmond.plist. Despite its name, this user-level LaunchAgent is not an Apple component. It uses RunAtLoad and KeepAlive to launch and maintain the tunnel.

The Linux branch adds an @reboot cron entry. Windows code attempts to create a SysMon startup task running as SYSTEM, with a Startup-folder script as a fallback. These are implemented code paths, not proof of successful infection across every platform.

The loader also collects the hostname, username, operating system, architecture, directory paths, Git email, and names of up to 40 potentially sensitive environment variables. Their values are not directly included in the initial beacon.

After 1.5 seconds, it checks the public IP and sends JSON over unencrypted HTTP to port 8099 at 134.209.82.225 and localhost. No additional executable is downloaded by this loader. Its SSH access could still support later attacker activity.

Earlier Open VSX Trivy extension attacks also hid unwanted activity behind working developer tools, though their payloads used local AI assistants instead.

Defenders should inspect authorized_keys for svc-telemetry, search for the persistence files, and review ssh or autossh processes using reverse forwarding. OpenSourceMalware’s published indicators include hashes for matching the altered JavaScript file.

CategoryIndicatorDescription
Package identityanthropic.claude-code@2.1.313Package identifier and version associated with the analyzed malicious artifact.
Network — IP address134.209.82.225Command-and-control server used for the reverse SSH tunnel and HTTP beacon.
Network — SSH endpoint134.209.82.225:22Remote SSH endpoint used to establish the tunnel.
Network — HTTP beaconhttp://134.209.82.225:8099/beaconRemote endpoint receiving collected host information over unencrypted HTTP.
Network — local beaconhttp://127.0.0.1:8099/beaconLoopback endpoint to which the loader also sends host information.
Network — public-IP lookupifconfig.meLegitimate service queried to obtain the victim’s public IP address.
Network — public-IP lookuphttps://api.ipify.orgLegitimate service queried to obtain the victim’s public IP address.
SSH — connection targettunnel@134.209.82.225Account and server used for the reverse SSH connection.
SSH — authorized-key commentsvc-telemetryComment attached to the attacker-controlled public key added to authorized_keys.
SSH — public-key fingerprintSHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htkFingerprint of the attacker-controlled SSH public key.
File — persistence script~/.config/.smtUnix-like persistence script that reconstructs the tunnel key and launches the connection.
File — key material~/.config/.smtkStored key material used by the Unix-like persistence script.
Persistence — macOS LaunchAgent~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plistDeceptively named LaunchAgent configured to maintain persistence.
File — temporary SSH key${TMPDIR}/.stk_*Filename pattern for the decoded, embedded SSH private key.
File — Windows persistence script~/.config/smt.cmdWindows script used to maintain the SSH tunnel.
File — Windows key material~/.config/smtkStored key material used by the Windows persistence script.
Persistence — Windows scheduled taskSysMonName of the startup task the malware attempts to create as SYSTEM.
Persistence — Windows Startup scriptsysmon.cmdStartup-folder fallback script used for persistence.
SHA-256 — extension.jsecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15Hash of the analyzed malicious JavaScript entry point.
SHA-256 — embedded tunnel private key7e0a52885fadee05544a9e99eb18c792bec05900a5e1a66d68f8383decb0e278Hash of the decoded, embedded SSH private key.
SHA-256 — analyzed directory aggregate18756b75afedee74bbf49832a1b1dada4961672c41d595be5c1bbe75709de927Deterministic aggregate digest of the analyzed directory, not an individual file hash.

If the extension ran, isolate the host, preserve evidence, and block the server on ports 22 and 8099. Remove persistence after collection, rotate exposed credentials from a clean device, and investigate follow-on access.

Uninstalling the extension alone cannot establish that the system is trustworthy. Teams should also review authentication, shell, editor, process, and network logs before deciding whether rebuilding the affected machine is necessary to restore confidence in security.

Cursor confirmed that a malicious Claude Code extension, version 2.1.313, was distributed through its extension marketplace, affecting at most 5,000 users. The company said the modified package was not developed by Anthropic and that its audit found no other extensions had been tampered with.

Cursor temporarily shut down the marketplace, removed the malicious package, rotated keys, rebuilt the service, and restored access. It also worked with the hosting provider to take the attacker’s server offline

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Guru Baran
Guru Baranhttps://cybersecuritynews.com
Gurubaran KS is a cybersecurity analyst, and Journalist with a strong focus on emerging threats and digital defense strategies. He is the Co-Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Cyber Security News, where he leads editorial coverage on global cybersecurity developments.
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