Kimwolf v7 Botnet Uses Chrome Browser Fingerprints to Hide HTTP/2 DDoS Attacks

Kimwolf v7 is raising the stakes for attacks launched from everyday Android TV boxes and set-top devices.

The latest version can make disruptive web traffic look more like a real visitor browsing a site, making defensive filtering harder at a critical moment.

The botnet has been active under related names since 2024, moving from Linux internet-connected devices to Android targets in 2025.

It reaches exposed Android Debug Bridge services through residential proxy networks, allowing attackers to install malware without authentication.

Unit 42 said in a report shared with Cyber Security News (CSN) that the new build was found on February 3, 2026.

The finding follows a period in which Kimwolf had already drawn attention for the scale of its Android infections, detailed in this earlier Kimwolf Android infection report.

The risk is not limited to a single household device. Each compromised box can be directed to send traffic at a chosen target, while its owner may see little obvious sign of misuse.

That large, distributed pool has made the wider family a serious DDoS concern, as shown by the Aisuru record DDoS attack.

Kimwolf v7 Botnet Uses Chrome Browser Fingerprints

Kimwolf v7 introduces an HTTP/2 flood that builds full Chrome-like browser fingerprints before sending requests.

In practice, it copies details that websites normally expect from a browser, including the pattern of request headers, instead of relying on plainly artificial traffic.

That change matters because many defenses look for unusual or incomplete requests when deciding what to block.

When malicious requests better resemble ordinary browsing, operators face a tougher balance between stopping an attack and accidentally interrupting real visitors.

The malware uses an HTTP/2 library to generate this traffic and retains a broader set of 15 denial-of-service methods.

It also includes a performance-tuned UDP flood designed for the ARM processors common in TV hardware, widening the ways infected devices can be used.

This is not simply a larger stream of junk requests. By borrowing the appearance of a popular browser, the botnet tries to blend into the same application layer that online stores, public services and media sites depend on.

Defenders need to assess patterns across many requests, rather than trusting a single header or connection detail.

Kimwolf v7 appears more focused than earlier builds. Researchers found that scanning, exploitation and password-guessing features were removed, suggesting the group may now depend on separate tools for infections while the bot handles attacks and traffic relaying.

Resilient Control Infrastructure

The operators also rebuilt the botnet’s command system to better withstand takedowns.

Kimwolf can query Ethereum Name Service records through several public blockchain endpoints, use an apparent operator-controlled relay, and fall back to a Tor hidden service if its normal route fails.

All command traffic passes through a local proxy component, making it easier to change routing without replacing the main bot.

The design reflects a response to disruptions in December 2025 and adds layers that can delay efforts to cut infected devices off from their controllers.

Network teams should avoid blocking shared blockchain services wholesale, because legitimate users may need them.

Instead, they should investigate unexpected connections from device types that have no normal reason to use those services, correlate them with proxy activity, and preserve logs that can reveal whether a device is part of a coordinated campaign.

For defenders, the most useful warning signs are unusual blockchain service connections from Android or IoT hardware, Tor or SOCKS proxy activity, and suspicious local proxy behaviour.

Administrators should isolate Android TV devices from business networks and disable ADB or limit it to USB-only use, which removes the main infection path.

This is especially relevant for organisations that treat streaming boxes as harmless appliances.

The reported Kimwolf operator arrest case shows the law-enforcement pressure around the botnet, but the technical changes show why device owners still need to act.

Reviewing the broader Android TV botnet risks can help teams spot similar exposure before it becomes an incident.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):-

Type	Indicator	Description
SHA-256	406647de09a0ffa279756b4ccb344b1b76a333320c5b50fd367901fa006cf0ff	Kimwolf v7 ARM ELF baseline payload
MD5	d759364844d78a728505fb0485c3adbc	MD5 for the baseline payload
SHA-256	345222bca004595977f971d76900b0c65fd9bf9d91c50cd0c5bf5a93f1ad9e49	Kimwolf v7 ARM ELF payload
MD5	036bcb62be72c4663b9564955f93b05f	MD5 for the associated ELF payload
SHA-256	2ec2e85b0358e0c681cb5067489a9086ec97dbbf7e3c952dd9cd496b319d5af5	Kimwolf v7 ELF payload containing the operator-linked RPC subdomain
MD5	33faca1e0090f6b12eff703daf4606e4	MD5 for the associated ELF payload
SHA-256	951c94809aa6c7ab587125f9d4df30fa6a49ee0cbba76a4b7ceedaaa0e5dcd36	Kimwolf Android APK masquerading as a system log service
SHA-256	f07821e313c16cbbd82def45094a22c8d474164051bdbc7648d6869e012014b4	Related Kimwolf Android APK sample
VHash	76554ad09897ac723a850eaf8c525efa	Structural hash shared by Kimwolf v7 ELF samples
SHA-1 certificate	2a1d96f1b066877812587ac94f45f82dfff5f5f9	Self-signed APK signing certificate
SHA-256 TLS certificate	f3e8a55a2a3ea7c7b6676e90f4f49a2c55b13065b68ee50c51cc35fe2b5c3237	Certificate associated with the RPC infrastructure
SHA-256	9470c68f9b6fe5f90d61891b95623afd7b4298815b0f95e25610e1c09008dc24	ARM payload associated with the first dropped ELF filename
SHA-256	8242443dfcec66e3fe04cbfa2fbd211ad34065ee07aa93813d792a437caab212	ARM payload associated with the second dropped ELF filename
SHA-256	421111a57b0a4224c052fa4108d90429d579974b5b5111ed2e58516ba09422ca	x86 payload associated with the version-one dropped ELF filename
File name	libn[redacted]kernel.so	Dropped ARM and x86 Kimwolf kernel payload filename
File name	libdevice.so	Dropped ARM Kimwolf kernel payload filename
File name	libcow.so	Filename used by an earlier x86 sample
Process name	netd_service	Process name used by the v7 ELF payload for masquerading
Process name	TVHelper	Process name used by the libdevice.so variant
Android package	com.android.logcatd	Package name used by identified Kimwolf Android APKs
Domain	rpcuniverse[.]com	Infrastructure domain linked to the suspected operator-controlled RPC service
Domain	eth.rpcuniverse[.]com	RPC subdomain hard-coded in a Kimwolf sample
Domain	avax.rpcuniverse[.]com	Subdomain resolving to the associated infrastructure host
URL	hxxps[:]//0xrpc[.]io/eth	Public Ethereum RPC endpoint queried by the malware
URL	hxxps[:]//eth.llamarpc[.]com	Public Ethereum RPC endpoint queried by the malware
URL	hxxps[:]//ethereum-rpc.publicnode[.]com	Public Ethereum RPC endpoint queried by the malware
URL	hxxps[:]//eth-protect.rpc.blxrbdn[.]com	Public Ethereum RPC endpoint queried by the malware
URL	hxxps[:]//eth.merkle[.]io	Public Ethereum RPC endpoint queried by the malware
IP address	23.94.221[.]104	Host associated with the RPC infrastructure and contacted by ELF and APK samples
IP address:port	212.193.31[.]158:443	HTTPS command-and-control traffic
IP address:port	212.193.31[.]119:13	Command-and-control traffic
IP address:port	212.193.31[.]122:13	Command-and-control traffic
IP address	212.193.31[.]102	Command-and-control host linked through a shared SSH host key
IP address:port	212.193.31[.]92:443	HTTPS command-and-control traffic
Local proxy	127.0.0[.]1:23075	Local proxy endpoint used to route command traffic
Tor hidden service	edctgwib2n5l34t525zkxqzk5bqb6e5il2yiq5r6zu7gtlxa4uosn3qd[.]onion	Kimwolf v7 command-and-control fallback

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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