Tuesday, November 10, 2026
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DarkSword iOS Exploit Platform Uses Coruna Malware to Steal Crypto Wallet Recovery Phrases

DarkSword operators are using Coruna malware to steal cryptocurrency wallet recovery phrases from iPhones, turning browser exploits into a ready-to-use theft service.

Exposed server directories revealed wallet modules, command systems, and records of stolen data, giving researchers a closer look at how the platform works beyond its initial exploit chain.

A copy of one production server contained 11 victim recovery phrases, 179 device loot directories, and a roster of 75 operator accounts.

Those records point to a commercial operation with agents, commissions, and device limits. They do not establish 179 confirmed victims or show the total value of stolen cryptocurrency.

Researchers from Censys identified the exposed DarkSword/Coruna infrastructure through an internal index of open directories between September 15 and September 17, 2026.

In its October 7 report, the company linked five previously undocumented hosts to delivery, staging, analysis, and control systems. Some infrastructure remained active when researchers examined it.

DarkSword iOS Exploit Platform Uses Coruna Malware

DarkSword supplies the route into the device, while Coruna supplies the wallet theft tools. Earlier DarkSword exploit coverage explains how the chain attacks WebKit and JavaScriptCore, breaks out of the browser sandbox, and gains kernel access.

It then reaches SpringBoard, the iOS process that controls app launches and the screen. After that access is gained, the platform loads three main layers: a starting beacon, a second-stage controller, and a core implant.

The SpringBoard coordinator watches for supported wallet apps to open, then injects the matching theft module into the running app. Its injection checks are limited to one per three seconds for each app bundle.

The exposed kit contains 18 wallet modules targeting apps including MetaMask, Phantom, Trust Wallet, Coinbase, Exodus, imToken, and Bitpie.

DarkSword exploit chain (Source - Censys)
DarkSword exploit chain (Source – Censys)

Previous Coruna exploit analysis describes the wider toolkit behind this theft model. The newly examined implant also searches photos and Apple Notes for BIP39 recovery phrases, sending only phrases that pass checksum checks.

That checking step helps filter out random text before stolen material reaches the server. The implant can also collect contacts, update itself, and fetch daily settings.

Its wallet modules share an AES encryption key, backup domain-generation settings, and five data collection endpoints. They imitate Safari traffic and disable TLS certificate checks.

A Reseller Platform With Active Devices

One exposed server contained a Python delivery service and a FastAPI admin panel backed by a database. The service registers devices on their first visit, serves landing pages, collects exploit reports, and passes commands to implants.

The panel supports agent accounts, commission rates, device quotas, and more than 60 allowed commands. Separate logs showed two iPhones checking a beacon page every three seconds for hours on September 6. They ran iOS 16.1 and 16.3.1.

Earlier DarkSword infrastructure tracking documented rapidly changing servers and web properties; the latest findings expose the software and account structure behind that activity rather than just its public pages.

The evidence needs careful reading. Files first suspected of holding stolen browser data on one host proved to be small test-device reports.

The production-server copy provided stronger evidence of wallet recovery-phrase theft, but Censys said its origin was unknown. Researchers rejected its claim that it came from an authorized red-team exercise.

Censys also matched 22 samples from infections in the wild to a separate command server. Two samples targeted BitKeep, adding a nineteenth wallet target.

Certificate records connected that infrastructure to Tencent hosting and lab systems in Shenyang, China. The researchers distinguished this operator from the exposed-directory cluster and did not name either group.

Development files referenced CVE-2026-31001, described as a JavaScriptCore type-confusion issue aimed at iOS 26. However, companion sandbox and kernel stages were placeholders.

This was unfinished work, not a deployed iOS 26 attack. A separate CoreAudio zero-click claim in the operator registry also remained unverified on a device.

Defenders should prioritize current iOS updates and track server fingerprints alongside network indicators.

Censys says the established chains are patched, while Apple confirms that DarkSword fixes were extended to more iOS 18 devices. Changing payload hashes mean hash-only detection will miss variants; shared code signatures offer wider coverage.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Network and Infrastructure Indicators

All entries below come from the source report. Association with an operator’s lab or management system does not establish that a host served malware. Infrastructure status reflects the report’s observations, not a fresh availability check.

TypeIndicatorRole or context
IP:port43.134.165[.]205:9999DS-Fusion v1.0 distribution bundle
IP:port166.88.95[.]90:9999Operational command server with beacon telemetry
IP:port23.148.212[.]237:8888Operator analysis workspace; unfinished iOS 26 development
IP:port47.102.192[.]23:9876Coruna staging host
IP:ports156.239.230[.]120:8080, 156.239.230[.]120:80Exposed control platform and landing page
IP:port185.189.45[.]40:8080Earlier payload capture containing GHOST exploit stages
IP / domain112.213.108[.]85 / hdios[.]cnProduction server; hostname VM-NJb8T5qJl6
IP / domain154.18.187[.]160 / fc.rsqqq[.]topBackup delivery stack; hostname SG-B20702-I
IP / domain202.146.222[.]253 / i.131422[.]comFormer production server; hostname C202609121655717
IP / domain203.91.77[.]253 / st.onlinefc[.]topOperator work machine
IP:ports154.217.250[.]206:80, 154.217.250[.]206:888Suspected operator panel; moderate-confidence assessment
IP:port14.128.47[.]81:443Separate deployment of the group-named control panel
Domainccwu[.]ccParent domain of three panel-related subdomains; individual names not supplied
Domainwumian[.]cc.cdPanel-related hostname
C2 URLhxxps://66ds[.]lolSeparate operator’s command server in 22 wild samples
Origin IP101.35.158[.]183Tencent-hosted origin behind the Cloudflare-fronted domain
Domainiplcz[.]cnOperator lab parent domain
Lab domainsnorthlab[.]cn, g.northlab[.]cn, manager.g.northlab[.]cnLab and management infrastructure; not identified as payload-serving hosts
Lab IPs218.25.85[.]177, 218.25.85[.]178, 59.46.4[.]117, 59.46.4[.]119Shenyang mail and lab infrastructure
Fallback C2hxxp://199.30.90[.]154:18090Hardcoded lab deployment host in the implant
Fallback patternhxxps://backup%u[.]fitWallet framework fallback replaced in wild builds
Operator contact@v66dbTelegram sales contact on the landing page
Operator contact URLhxxps://t.me/YATA0000Hidden contact link in the control panel
Historical campaign domainssiekeltd[.]com, escofiringbijou[.]comEarlier DarkSword campaign indicators cited in the report’s references; not newly discovered cluster hosts

Payload and Panel Hashes

These values are reproduced exactly from the report. Censys did not label the algorithm of the 40-character shared module hash, so it is not presented as a confirmed SHA-1 value.

File or artifactHash typeValue
bootstrap.dylibSHA-256c391bce7b09a0ea263e4b2c1d1bde0327c180723fa3299b006485429564c61ee
stage2.dylibSHA-2568973e80ab494c02463d4123f76fc5e2dca2ea2c097317d246323d75c1f2eb791
core_v6.dylibSHA-256a50c4da5c92636b2b1f170cdce3bd967a213886a8df5656cf3519214fcecfac5
core_a5.dylibSHA-25654a4166ab33ffe02b41de9c943e783d20129b6cc22f56b7fe7d564fd02bde006
future-destroy.htmSHA-2567ff5bb16cd5f8c92bc4fec72bba162662f202af075418db5000a1b4f81489fc2
Shared Coruna payload moduleAlgorithm unspecified1334417664270db20af705f422878c53c8378203
Control-panel page bodyBody hash, algorithm unspecified864d68e64618d6bfc26d75d6f780ae0b7bfed3698cc8333818ed32519e560d1f

Device, File, and Certificate Artifacts

These artifacts can support investigation when found alongside other evidence; generic filenames or cookies alone should not be treated as proof of compromise.

Artifact typeValueContext
LaunchDaemon path/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.ds.agent.plistDevice-side persistence
LaunchDaemon labelcom.apple.ds.agentPersistence service label
Command channel/tmp/nb_cmdLocal interprocess command channel
Result channel/tmp/nb_resultLocal interprocess result channel
Cookiesds_uuid, ds_done, coruna-lab-sessionDevice/session tracking
Wallet moduleswallet01 through wallet18Eighteen wallet theft modules
BitKeep modulewallet19, libbitDylib.dylib, aware_retreat.cssBitKeep identifiers and disguised module filename
Delivery artifactsgroup.html, exploit_server.py, darksword.dbLanding page, delivery service, and control database
Telemetry filesc2_results.jsonl, reports.jsonlCommand results and device reports
Development filesrce_worker_26.js, kernel_priv_26.js, vchain/Unfinished iOS 26 work; not evidence of a deployed chain
Older delivery chaingooll/, gooll.html, entry1_type0x09.dylibChain targeting older iOS versions
Delivery and variant artifacts/ios18/frame.html, manifest.json, daily_render.php, variants/set0Version routing and changing payload builds
Certificate issuerCodex iOS Isolated Lab Root CA 2026Private certificate authority linking the separate operator’s origin
Certificate organizationIPLCZ Test LabCertificate pivot used to identify the origin
Panel identifiersC2 Control Panel, C2 PANEL v3.0, 幽灵集团Panel title, version banner, and group name

Embedded Keys and Configuration Strings

The following are malware configuration values published by Censys, not victim credentials.

Configuration artifactExact valuePurpose
AES keyEk8pl31K2yeHgQwyShared data-transfer encryption
Wallet deployment seedUNDEFINED_DEPLOYMENT_SEEDDomain generation
Wallet reporting seedUNDEFINED_REPORTING_SEEDDomain generation
7z fallback passwordc73dfcfd60a0c7ebcc03352d433349bcFallback transport configuration; not the build-time archive password
Plasma deployment seed09d0b8d58a71653cd1c89c64c866f2e6Deployment domain pool
Plasma reporting seed2d2aebba0bf3d7d694194a7ab93b0a96Reporting domain pool

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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Tushar Subhra Dutta
Tushar Subhra Dutta
Tushar is a senior cybersecurity and breach reporter. He specializes in covering cybersecurity news, trends, and emerging threats, data breaches, and malware attacks. With years of experience, he brings clarity and depth to complex security topics.
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